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I. INTRODUCTION 
he Multicast and Broadcast service offers the 
possibility to distribute data to multiple M.S. with 
one single message. This saves cost and 
bandwidth. Broadcasted messages in IEEE 802.16e are 
encrypted symmetrically with a shared key [1]. Every 
member in the group knows the key & can decrypt the 
traffic. Message authentication is also based on the 
same shared key. This algorithm contains the 
vulnerability that every group member, besides 
decrypting and verifying broadcast messages, can also 
encrypt and authenticate messages as if they originate 
from the legitimate B.S [1, 3, 4, 5]. Another aspect which 
is much more problematic is the distribution of the traffic 
encryption keys (GTEKs), when the optional Multicast 
and Broadcast Rekeying Algorithm (MBRA) is used [6]. 
To transfer a GTEK to all group members it is 
broadcasted but encrypted with the key encryption key 
(GKEK). Due to broadcasting, the GKEK must also be a 
shared key and every group member knows it
 
[1]. Thus 
are adversary
 
group member can use it to generate 
valid encrypted and authenticated GTEK key update 
command messages &
 
distribute an own GTEK
 
[1]. 
Every group member would establish the adversary’s 
key as a valid next GTEK.
 
[1]
 
Subsequently all traffic 
sent by the legitimate B.S can no longer be decrypted 
by the M.S. From M.Ss point of view only traffic from the 
adversary is valid. To force M.Ss to establish the 
adversary’s
 
key, there are several possibilities;
 
If the 
implementation does not work properly, the key from the 
latter of two subsequently sent GTEK update command 
messages may overwrite the former one. Hence, the 
adversary just has to send its GTEK update command 
message after the B.S broadcasted a key update 
message. If the implementation follows the standard, 
the keys of both messages are accepted [1]. To be sure 
the M.S will not establish the legitimate B.Ss
 
key;
 
an 
intruder could forge some part of the B.Ss GTEK update 
command message
 
[1];
 
Such a changed message 
would not be verified as correct and discarded by the 
M.Ss. After this, the adversary can send its own GTEK 
update command message which will be accepted [1, 
7]. In a unicast connection, this different keying material 
at the mobile station would be detected as the B.S 
cannot decrypt data sent by the M.S. This result in a 
TEK invalid message destined to the M.S which 
subsequently refreshes its keying material
 
[1]. Since the 
M.Bs is only unidirectional so; the B.S unable to detect 
that M.S has different GTEKs.
 
 
  
  
   
  
    
 
  
   
   
  
  
 
 
  
   
 II. SHARED KEY IN MULTICAST AND 
BROADCAST SERVICE
 A shared key cannot be used as every group
 member can forge messages when having the current 
symmetric keys [1]. Instead the GTEK update command 
message could be sent to each M.S in a unicast way 
like the GKEK update command message
 
[1]. The key 
should then be encrypted with the M.S related KEK 
T 
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which is only known by this individual M.S. The BS 
sends the GTEK update command message by itself 
ඔ
ȥ
 when the current key’s lifetime is going to expire
 
[1]. The 
Fig.1 shows this.
 
Another solution is the use of public 
key cryptography. Here, the GTEK update command 
message remains broadcasted and encrypted with the 
shared key GKEK but is additionally signed by an 
asymmetric signature
 
[1]. M.Ss receiving a GTEK 
update command message can verify the signature of 
the B.S and subsequently decrypt the GTEK
 
with the 
shared GKEK
 
[1]. The Fig.2 shows this method together 
with the unicasted GKEK update
 
command message.
 
A third possibility is to generate GTEKs as part 
of a one
 
way hash chaining function (Fig. 3). Here the 
B.S has to
 
generate a random number which represents 
the initial
 
key GTEK0
 
[1]. Then the other GTEKs are 
generated by
 
applying a one way hash function to 
previous
 
GTEKs respectively.
 
This is iterated n times.
 
 
GTEK0 = random ()
 
GTEK1 = f (GTEK0)
 GTEK2 = f (GTEK1)
 
   GTEKn = f (GTEKn-1)
 
 
 
 
Fig.1 :
 
Possible solution to transmit GTEK in a secure 
Way
 
 
 
 Fig.2 :
 
Possible solution to transmit GTEK in a secure
 Way
 
 To apply this
 
algorithm, the key GKEK update 
command message
 
has to be capable of transporting 
GKEK and GTEK
 
keys together
 
[1]. The design of the 
key update command
 
message already includes both 
keys so only a little modification
 
is needed
 
here. 
Additionally the GTEK state
 
machine at B.S must 
generate the GTEK hash chain & store all the keys. The 
GTEK state machine at M.S must
 
add the functionality to 
authenticate GTEK keys by
 
calculating the hash function 
and comparing it to the
 
previous key
 
[1]. A drawback of 
this algorithm is that it has a reduced
 
forward secrecy
 [1]. This means a M.S joining the group
 
can decrypt all
broadcasted data since the last hash
 
chain generation. 
If forward secrecy is crucial, the hash
 
chain has to be 
regenerated each time a M.S enters the
 
group
 
[1]. When 
using an asymmetric signature or a hash
 
chain to 
authenticate the GTEK transfer, only one message
 
is 
needed to update the keys of all M.S due to
 broadcasting
 
[1]. Thus the introduced traffic in these
 solutions
 
is constant and does not depend on the
number of
 
members in the group
 
[1]. Another important 
fact is
 
that, for
 
unicasting the computing power 
requirement is very
 
low. Because here the M.S just have 
to verify the
 
HMAC & save the keys
 
[1]. Also the use of a 
hash chain
 
does not require much computation. Here 
the M.S has to
 
calculate the hash function of the 
received key and
 
compare it with the saved key
 
[1]. 
Secure Authentication & Key Establishment Protocol with Perfect Forward Secrecy for Multi and Broad 
Cast Service in IEEE 802.16e
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Fig.3 :
 
Avoid key forgery by a GTEK hash chain
 
 
III. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOLS
 
In this section, we propose three user 
authentication with key establishment protocols (UAKE) 
satisfying: Class-1, Class-3, and Class-7 PFS. The 
proposed protocols only use one-way hash functions &
 
exclusive-or (XOR) operations. Each proposed protocol 
involves two phases:
 
1) the initialization phase 2)
 
the 
user authentication with key establishment phase. Table 
I shows the notations used throughout our protocols.
 
 
 
Table 1 :
 
The notations used in our Protocols
 
Notations
 
Description
 
 
MD
 
 
the mobile device
 
S the authentication server
 
AS
 
the application server
 
IDMD
 
the identity of MD
 
IDS
 
the identity of S
 
IDAS
 
the identity of AS
 
x a secret key held by the
 
3:0' the password of MD
 
6$6  the shared key between S and AS
 
KÂ a secure one-way hash function
 
__ string concatenation operation
 
ʍ

exclusive-or operation
 
Secure Authentication & Key Establishment Protocol with Perfect Forward Secrecy for Multi and Broad 
Cast Service in IEEE 802.16e
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i. The initialization phase: 
In   this   protocol, S computes AMD = h (IDMD || 
x) and stores it in MD. Moreover, S computes AAS =
h(IDAS || x) and sends it to AS via a secure channel.
ii. User authentication with key establishment phase: 
Step 1. MD generates a random number RMD to
compute M1 = AMD ʍ RMD and M1_MAC = h 
(IDMD || RMD ) ʍ PWMD. Then MD sends (IDMD, 
IDAS, M1, M1 MAC) to AS. 
Step 2. After receiving (IDMD, IDAS, M1, M1_MAC), AS
generates a random number RAS to compute 
M2 = AASʍ RAS and M2_MAC = h(IDAS || RAS ) ʍ
SAS. Then AS sends (IDMD, M1, M1_MAC, M2, 
M2 MAC) to S. 
Step 3. S computes RMD = M1 ʍ h (IDMS || x) and RAS
= M2 ʍ h(IDAS || x) using its secret key x. 
Then S checks whether M1_MAC and M2_MAC are 
the same with h (IDMD || RMD) ʍ PWMD and 
h(IDAS || RAS) ʍ SAS, respectively. If both 
verifies pass, step 4 is then performed. 
Otherwise, S denies this request.
Step 4. Next, S generates a session key K to 
compute MMD = h (RMD) ʍ K, MMD_MAC = h(RMD
|| K), MAS = h(RAS ) ʍ K and MAS_MAC = h(RAS
|| K). Then, S sends (IDMD, MMD, MMD_MAC, 
IDAS, MAS, MAS MAC ) to AS. 
Step 5. As computes K = MDASʍ h (RAS) and checks 
whether MAS_MAC is the same with h(RAS || K). 
If they are the same, AS can obtain the 
session key K and then sends (IDMD, MMD, 
MMD MAC) to MD. 
Step 6. After receiving (IDMD      , MMD , MMD_MAC ), MD
computes K = MMD ʍ h (RMD ) and checks 
whether MMD_MAC is the same with h(RMD || K). 
If they are the same, MD also can obtain K. 
b) The Proposed UAKE Protocol with Class-7 PFS
In this protocol, an attacker cannot get the 
previous session keys even if PWMD, SAS, and x are all 
disclosed. The process is explained below.
i. The initialization phase: 
Before the protocol begins, S computes AMD = 
h(IDMD || x) and stores it in MD. Also, S computes AAS = 
h (IDAS || x) and sends it to AS via a secure channel.
ii. User authentication with key agreement phase:
Step 1. MD chooses a large prime p, a primitive 
a) The Proposed UAKE Protocol with Class-1 PFS
In this protocol, an attacker cannot obtain the 
previous session keys even if PWMD and SAS are both 
disclosed. Details are given with the following steps.
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element g in Galois filed GF  (p) and a 
random number d    [1, p-1]. Then, MD 
computes M1 = AMD ͰJ d and M1_MAC = 
h(IDMD || gd)  Ͱ3:MD, and sends  
Step 2.  After receiving (IDMD, IDAS, p,  g, M1, M1_MAC),  
AS chooses a random number a   [1, p-1] 
to compute M2  = AAS  ͰJa and M2_MAC = 
h(IDAS  || gd )  Ͱ6AS. Then AS sends (IDMD, p,  
g ,M1, M1 MAC, IDAS, M2, M2 MAC)  to S.  
Step 3.  S computes gd = M1  ͰK,' 0 ' __[DQGJa 
= M2 ͰK,' $6__ [  using its secret key x. 
Then S verifies whether M1_MAC and 
M2_MAC are equal to h(IDMS || gd)  Ͱ 
PWMD and h(IDAS || ga)  Ͱ 6$6
respectively. If they are both equal, step 4 
is subsequently carried out. Otherwise, S 
denies this request.  
Step 4.  S chooses a random number sࣅ[1, p-1] to
compute kCS = (ga)s
 = g as  and kAS  = (gd)s  = 
gds. Then S computes  MMD  = kCS  ْ  gd, 
MMD_MAC  = h(kCS || g d), MAS = kAS ْ ga  
and MAS_MAC = h(kAS || ga) sends them 
to AS.   
Step 5.  After receiving  (IDMD, MMD, MMD_MAC, IDAS, 
MAS, MAS_MAC), AS  computes       kAS  = MAS  Ͱ 
ga  and verifies whether MAS_MAC equals 
to h(kAS || g a). If it holds, AS can compute 
the session key K from K = (KAS  ) a
 = (g  ds) a  
= g ads. Then  AS  sends (IDMD, MMD, MMD_MAC)  
to MD.  
Step 6.  MD  computes kCS  = MMD  ͰJd and verifies 
whether MMD_MAC  equals to h(kCS || gd ). If 
they are equal, MD  can compute the 
session key K  from K = (kCS ) d
 = (g  as) d  = 
g ads. 
The proposed protocols only use one-way hash 
protocols also provide three kinds of PFS to meet 
different requirements. Therefore, compared with Sun 
and  Yeh’s protocols, our protocols are more efficient 
and practical for mobile devices. Wherever Times is 
specified, Times Roman or Times New Roman may be 
used. If neither is available on your word processor, 
please use the font closest in appearance to Times. 
Avoid using bit- mapped fonts if possible. True-Type 1 
or Open Type fonts are preferred. Please embed symbol 
fonts, as well, for math, etc. 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS  
In this section, we discuss some potential 
attacks which might occur on the proposed protocols. 
a)  Replay attack  
The replay attack is an attack in which an 
attacker can use the previous eavesdropped messages 
to login the server without being detected  [8]. Now, we 
are going to demonstrate in this subsection that, the 
Secure Authentication & Key Establishment Protocol with Perfect Forward Secrecy for Multi and Broad 
Cast Service in IEEE 802.16e
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functions and XOR operations. Moreover, the proposed 
proposed protocols can successfully withstand the 
replay attack.
i. The proposed UAKE protocol with Class-1 PFS: 
After sending (IDMD, IDAS, M1, M1_MAC) to S, an
attacker can get MMD in Step 4. However, the attacker 
can’t have AMD = h(IDMD || x) that contains a secret key 
x protected by one-way hashing function. This also
means that he cannot extract RMD to obtain K or PWMD
by computing      K = MMD ͰRMD or PWMD = h(IDMD ||
RMD) ͰM1_MAC. Thus, this protocol can prevent the replay 
attack.
ii. The proposed UAKE protocol with Class-3 PFS:
An attacker replays (IDMD, IDAS, M1, M1_MAC) to AS
in Step 1 and receives (IDMD, MMD, MMD_MAC) in Step 5. 
Because both AMD and RMD are unknown, the attacker 
cannot extract K or PWMD. As a result, the replay attack 
cannot be mounted in this protocol.
iii. The proposed UAKE protocol with Class-7 PFS:
Even if an attacker sends (IDMD, IDAS, M1, M1_MAC)
to AS in Step 1, he cannot obtain K or PWMD from AS’s 
reply. Without AMD, the attacker cannot obtain g d by
computing g d = M1ͰAMD. Also, the attacker faces the 
discrete logarithm problem in computing d. Thus, it is 
quite impossible for the replay attack to occur in this 
protocol.
b) Password guessing attack
This attack refers to an intruder attempts to 
pass the authentication with certain guessed password
[9, 10, 11]. The following discussions show, how the
proposed protocols can prevent the password guessing 
attack.
i. The proposed UAKE protocol with Class-1 PFS:
An intruder tries to send the eavesdropped 
message M1 and M *1_MAC = h(IDMD || R *MD ) ͰPW*MD to 
S in Step 1, where R*MD and PW*MD are generated by the 
intruder. In Step 2, S extracts RMD = M1Ͱh(IDMD || RMD)
to check whether M*1_MAC is the same with h(IDMD || RMD)
ͰPWMD [9]. The result is S will find the equation is not 
correct and then refuse the request. Moreover, the 
intruder has no extra information to verify the guessed 
password PWMD*. Therefore, the password guessing 
attack does not work in this protocol. 
ii. The proposed UAKE protocol with Class-3 PFS:
Assume that an intruder replays the 
eavesdropped message M1 and M*1_MAC = h(IDMD || 
R*MD)ͰPW*MD to AS in Step 1, where R*MD and PW*MD are 
generated by the intruder. If PW*MD and R*MD are not 
correct, S will detect this failure and stop the request in 
Step 3. Thus, the password guessing attack is 
prevented.
iii. The proposed UAKE protocol with Class-7 PFS:
An intruder attempts to send the eavesdropped 
message M1, M*1_MAC = h(IDMD || g* )ͰPW*MD to AS in
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Step 1, where g*  and  PW*MD  are generated by the 
intruder. However, in Step 3, S  will detect the failed login 
by verifying M1_MAC  because g*  and PW*MD  are not correct. 
Therefore, the intruder has no chance to perform the 
password guessing attack . 
c)  Perfect forward secrecy  
We show, as follows that the proposed 
protocols can satisfy Class-1, Class-3 and Class-7 PFS  
[12]. 
i. The proposed UAKE protocol with Class-1 PFS:  
When MD’s password PWMD  is disclosed, an 
attacker only can derive h(IDMD || RMD) = M1_MAC  Ͱ  PWMD.  
However, the attacker cannot further get the session key 
K  by computing K = h(RMD)  Ͱ  MMD  without AMD  [12]. Thus, 
this protocol can provide  Class-1 PFS.    
ii. The proposed UAKE protocol with Class-3 PFS:  
When PWMD  and  SAS  are disclosed, an attacker 
can obtain h(IDMD || RMD) = M1_MAC  Ͱ  PWMD  and h(IDAS  
|| RAS) = M2_MAC  Ͱ  SAS. However, the attacker still cannot 
know AMD  and AAS, which are stored in MD  and  AS  
respectively  [16]. Consequently, the attacker cannot 
extract RMD  and  RAS  from M1 = AMD  Ͱ  RMD  and M2 = AAS  
Ͱ  RAS. That is, the attacker cannot get the session key K  
by computing K = MMD  Ͱ  h(RMD)  or  K = MAS  Ͱ  h(RAS). 
This protocol can provide Class-3 PFS  [16].  
iii. The proposed UAKE protocol with Class-7 PFS:  
When PWMD , SAS  and x  are all disclosed, an 
attacker can obtain g d  and  g a  by  gd = M1  Ͱ  h(IDMD || x)  
and g a  = M2  Ͱ  h(IDAS  || x). Moreover, the attacker can 
derive kCS = MMD  Ͱ  g d  and  kAS  =  MAS  Ͱ  g a. To get the 
session key K = g ads, the attacker has to solve Diffie-
Hellman problem  [16]. Nevertheless, this is hard to be 
accomplished. Therefore, this protocol can provide 
Class-7 PFS.  
V. CONCLUSION  
Secured data transmission is one of the prime 
aspects of wireless networks as  they are much more 
vulnerable to security attacks. In this paper, we explore 
the possibility of key forgery in Multi- and Broadcast 
service. We proposed three UAKE protocols with PFS 
based upon one-way hash functions and XOR 
operations. The computation loads and power supply 
requirements are less, which make this protocol more 
efficient and suitable than other.  
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